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I. Introduction 
 
 We are quite sympathetic to the thrust of this conference, and to John 
Braithwaite's work over an illustrious career.  The legitimation of power, almost 
invariably including a discussion of limitations, temperance, is perhaps the heart of 
political philosophy.  The notion of division, of various sorts of power lodged in various 
places, inhibiting each other and so tyranny, is central to our understandings of the U.S. 
Constitution, with both a capital and a lowercase "c."1 Markets/integration/Europe/ 
globalization can, perhaps only can, be legitimated in terms of the interpenetration of 
powers, i.e., the destruction of national congruencies among peoples, ideologies, 
governments, industrial capacity and military capability most perfectly expressed by Nazi 
                                                
•• Louis A. Del Cotto Professor and Director, UB Program on Finance & Law, University at 
Buffalo, State University of New York.  We would like to thank Errol Meidinger and the 
Baldy Center for putting this conference together.  Christina Garsten, Rosa Lastra, Joseph 
Westbrook [LIST] helped at on or another stage of the argument.  The mistakes and other 
infelicities are our responsibility.   
• Senior Lecturer in Anthropology and Dean of Social Sciences, National University of 
Ireland at Maynooth. 
1 The locus classicus is the Federalist Papers.  See also Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1990. 
Constitutions and Culture Studies, Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 2, no. 1, 
Article 11. 
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Germany, albeit at the cost of alienation that we are now seeing expressed in the United 
States, Germany, and jarringly, Sweden, the Shangri La of U.S. left liberal politics.  
Arriving at the contemporary, we see leaders around the world whose reach must be 
limited for the sake of many.  So it is not that power and its limitation, especially through 
complex structures and more amorphous assemblages, do not pose profound and vital 
questions.   
 
 The invitation to this conference, however, asked us to address this topic in 
relation to our current scholarship.  In our work over the last decade or more, a less 
familiar view of "power" is emerging from the mists of social inquiry.  We might begin by 
recalling Hannah Arendt's distinction between power, understood by those subject to it 
to be authoritative because believed to be legitimate, and violence, which subjects merely 
suffer.2   Rather than assuming the existence of power and concerning ourselves with 
mechanisms for its temperance, we have been studying power as expressed in various 
"present situations" by officials whose offices are believed to be more or less legitimate if 
hardly infallible.  If this depiction fairly portrays some important aspects of our world, 
then a different posture for the academic would seem to be in order, at least in some 
circumstances.  But we are getting ahead of the argument. 
 
 We started and are still working together in the context of "Global Foresight," a 
multiyear, multinational and multidisciplinary project directed by Christina Garsten, 
professor of social anthropology at Stockholm University and Principal, Swedish 
Collegium for Advanced Studies.  The Program is funded by the Riksbankens 
Jubileumsfond, The Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences, perhaps 
best known for establishing the "Nobel" in Economics.3  The Jubileumsfond was itself 
established by the Riksbank, Sweden's central bank, which happens to be the oldest such 
bank in the world.   
 
 In diverse settings increasingly studied by ethnographers, plausible (and desirable 
or objectionable) futures are brought into the present by being mapped or otherwise 
represented. The combination of abstraction and plausibility tacitly implies an ethos of 
representation, i.e., the scenario is often assumed to be a fair articulation of a specific 
future state.  But the future made present is also performative and in that sense 
subjective.  And as the future is studied, as work is done today to attain or avoid some 
future, collectivities are constituted.  The image is of a map tending towards a blueprint, 
script, or even choreography, meant to be accurate even if also subjective, a participatory 
description.  We speak of "anticipatory knowledge," of things that organizations come to 
                                                
2 Hannah Arendt, "On Violence," in Crises of the Republic.  Arendt distinguishes power 
(recognized by tradition and common consent) from violence (born of political 
illegitimacy).  Thanks to Joseph A. Westbrook for the clarification. 
3 Technically . . .  
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know about that which, somewhat bewilderingly, has yet to come to be.  The future is 
thus made tractable, or at least made to appear to be tractable, in important present 
situations such the Bank of England,4 Google,5 the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund,6 
the World Economic Forum ("Davos")7 and others.  Mark's ethnographic research focuses 
on airport security comprising a host of institutions, from local police to NATO.  From 
these and other conversations (David is active in several fields), much more nuanced 
understandings of how officials think in time, and hence official power itself, emerge.   
 
 A word of caution: the various projects within Global Foresight do not constitute 
anything like a "map" of power in today's world, but they do form important islands in 
what might imagined as the archipelago of modernity.  It is a bit quick to claim that by 
looking at how the future is confronted by our officials we can glimpse, out of the corner 
of our eyes as it were, what it means to be "modern" now -- but something along those 
lines.8   
 
II. A Few Aspects of Officialdom 
 
 A few themes or general fields have emerged from analysis and discussion across 
the various sites comprised by Global Foresight.  What follows is a sketch of some key 
aspects of ways in which official power, i.e., power over modern life, is both quantitatively 
less and qualitatively different from what is often assumed.  Again, this is not an 
exhaustive list much less a logical demonstration of some "necessary" aspects of 
contemporary bureaucracies.    
 
A. Knowledgeable Uncertainty 
 
 In contemporary data-rich domains, information (sometimes boggling amounts of 
information) often coexists with significant uncertainty.  While uncertainty may be part 
of the human condition, consciousness of uncertainty is hardly constant.  In hindsight, 
                                                
4 Holmes, Douglas. 2014. Economy of Words: Communicative Imperatives in Central Banks. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
5 Mikkel Flyverbom and John Murray. 2018. Datastructuring: Organizing and curating 
digital traces into action, Big Data & Society, 5(2). https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951718799114 
6 Douglas Holmes [current, published?] 
7 Christina Garsten and Adrienne Sörbom. 2018. Discreet Power. How the World Economic 
Forum Shapes Market Agendas. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
8 I think it’s worth noting here—even in a footnote—that there are moves to recognize 
the limits of what ethnography can reasonably say (represent), and efforts to refunction 
ethnography so that it can legitimately say more. I would add, that some of our 
discussions are around how ethnography can be more that words: we what to get mixed 
up in the contemporary and consider roles that go beyond the representational.  
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the end of the twentieth century was marked by an astonishing level of confidence.  
Experts knew what they knew.  Catch phrases, "the end of history," "the Washington 
Consensus" and "the Great Moderation" express the spirit of the age that has passed.  The 
attacks of September 11th and any number of computer hacks made us aware of insecurity 
in new ways.  (The Department of Defense began funding efforts to develop a "science of 
security.")  The emergence of unlooked for political developments like the Arab Spring, 
the insolvency of Greece and Brexit, to say nothing of the election of Donald Trump to 
the Presidency of the United States made experts look foolish in real time.  And most 
importantly, the Global Financial Crisis cast entire disciplines and core systems into 
doubt.  Almost a full generation after September 11th, experts speak more hesitantly.  
They know that their conceptual frameworks are compromised, but they are not sure 
how, or to what extent.  New paradigms are in short supply. 
 
 And yet we have more information than ever before: more capacity to surveil, 
collect, and process data, capacities which themselves raise problems.  In such contexts, a 
host of conceptual and expressive tools are deployed to make sense of the world and act 
upon it: narratives and models, scenarios and exercises.  Much of the research in Global 
Foresight concerns the range of tools, and what tools teach their users.   
 
 Too often social scientists have assumed that such tools are either faulty or are 
followed slavishly, i.e., social scientists have tended to ask after the validity of the 
outputs.   Validity is of course important, but bureaucratic expertise is a practice before 
and after it is a substantive proposition to be falsified or not.  So, in an age of uncertainty 
another truth has emerged: the map may be necessary even if it is to some substantial but 
unknown degree wrong.  The expert must continue to navigate.  Failures of security -- 
being caught by surprise -- do not lead to admissions of error, but lead instead to more 
security, starting with measures designed to prevent the last failure ("closing the barn 
door after the horse escapes").    
 
 For example, the complete failure of ratings agencies to warn about the risks 
embedded in the financial products that triggered the GFC has not led to the collapse of 
those agencies, much less the abandonment of credit rating as a practice.  For reasons 
beyond the scope of this paper, credit rating is necessary to the custodial practices of 
social capitalism, and that function will be fulfilled.  The truth of a given credit rating, or 
likely to be produced by a given methodology, are distinct questions from the 
institutional necessity of the practice.  One may say similar things about LIBOR. 
 
 More generally, thinking in this hesitant age is often conducted with a view to 
conceptual horizons that seem difficult if not impossible to define.  The most obvious 
such horizon is "security," a word that emerges in field after field, i.e., not as quite the 
same word, but with the same problem: while insecurity is obvious in the event, whether 
or not something is secure -- really secure? -- cannot be known.  Similarly, while there is 
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an agreed upon definition of monetary stability, i.e., 2% inflation in the consumer price 
index, there is no such consensus definition of financial stability.  Experts know that they 
do not know as much as they used to think they did, but must proceed nonetheless. 
  
B. Domain/Limited Agency/Resource Allocation 
 
 How do the relatively senior figures in which we are primarily interested locate 
their authority, specify their jurisdictions, within a common contemporary, albeit one 
that is fractured or separated into “silos”?9   How do they organize their activity vis-à-vis 
other institutions; what relations do they have to manage?  Who are the clients, 
consumers, or competitors?  To whom do they ultimately answer?  An old Army joke: a 
bright young captain is giving a briefing about recent actions and presumed intentions of 
"the enemy."  A colonel curtly reminds him: "the Vietnamese are the adversary.  The Air 
Force is the enemy."  (Services may be changed to fit the speaker's service.)  Or, to put the 
matter in most familiar terms: how much of the work of the University is neither 
research, nor teaching, nor even "service" (whatever that might be felt to be), but 
struggles for advancement within the University itself? 
 
 Consequently, the scope of official agency is often quite narrow in practice, much 
more narrow than implied by words like "state," "government" or even "law."  Such words 
are abstract, unspecified, and hence unconstrained, implying freedom of action.  Actual 
officials, however, are specified in countless ways, hemmed in, their options limited.  
Actual officials never see the freedom promised by the abstract "state."  As further 
discussed below, officials often have little capacity to do much besides what they already 
do, which may or may not be the right thing.   
 
 In order to keep doing what they are doing at all, officials generally must struggle 
for resources.  Many of the activities in which we are interested do not, in themselves, 
make money or otherwise generate resources.  A compliance program is a cost center.  
Airport security is expensive, bothersome, and by its nature raises concerns about privacy, 
discrimination, and an overweening state.  It is only when things go wrong that a well 
drafted legal document, or a weapons system, or a well-designed airport, proves that the 
cost was worth it.  Until such failures, the erosion of the institution's justification and 
hence its funding is the order of the day.  During a bull market, an understaffed SEC 
could and did ignore whistleblowers, and Bernie Madoff would operate a complex Ponzi 
scheme for years and years.  
 
                                                
9 It is worth noting the number of societal domains in the so-called western world, and 
beyond, where institutions complain of “silos”, “walled gardens”, “stove pipes”, etc. See 
Tett, Gillian. 2016. The Silo Effect: The peril of expertise and the promise of breaking down 
Barriers. New York: Simon & Schuster.  
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C. The Public 
 
 “The public” is neither neutral nor trivial nor often clearly specified.  How do 
officials imagine their public or audience in terms of representation, the justification 
given to license actions or resource allocations, or to legitimate actions that may result in 
risk or failure?  For whom are the experts expert?  What counts as success or failure? And 
how does the success of the enterprise affect the future of an office or the trajectory of a 
career, i.e., how is the official rewarded (or punished), and how are such actions publicly 
legitimated?    
 
 Such questions are familiar, even traditional, in the context of corporate 
governance.  The same questions take on added urgency in security contexts, when lives 
are often at stake, and the usual mechanisms of transparency and accountability may not 
be available.   
 
D. The Weight of History 
 
 Like so much work in the social sciences, Global Foresight asks after the public 
interest.  (The project must present itself as in the service of the public, or it could not be 
publicly funded.)  "What is the public interest" reads in the present tense, but not only is 
the future in many of the settings that we study not only not new, it is on the contrary 
quite often old, and consequently constrained.   
 
 For dramatic example, the United States war in Afghanistan is now the nation's 
longest running campaign.  The Forever War has become not something transitory (to be 
won and so ended), but the norm, the context of business.  How is the future of the war 
envisioned?  What is the nation trying to accomplish?  What is our preferred scenario?  
During the heyday of the neocons there was talk of nation building, optimistic at the time 
and simply no longer credible.  "Getting Bin Laden" provided a purpose, if a grisly one, 
but he was finally killed.  Political speeches continue to rely on abstractions -- security, 
protecting freedom, etc. -- but they do not suffice to explain this policy not that.  "Get the 
job done."  But what is the job?  So Trump ran on getting out of Afghanistan.  He later 
supported sending another 4,000 troops.  But why not zero?  Or 14,000?  Or 24,000?10 
 
 What might a reason to continue our efforts in Afghanistan look like?  It might be 
argued that the United States needs to be in Afghanistan, even at the cost of running a 
                                                
10 I think there should be an acknowledgment of the most popular single-variable theory 
(the usual one is “it’s oil, man”) which is opium production. I know that this isn’t the 
point in the paper, but someone always want a simple explanation. (this is typical: 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jan/09/how-the-heroin-trade-explains-the-us-
uk-failure-in-afghanistan)    
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low voltage unwinnable war, because it gives us a heavy physical presence in South 
Central Asia.  Perhaps, in their time in the same place, that is what the British believed.  
Afghanistan, in this view, is not a strategic objective, the graveyard of empires, so much 
as a tactical cost in the great game.  This argument has not been made officially; it is not a 
public justification.  Fighting a war in order to be able to threaten your neighbors is 
hardly a politically correct argument.  At least in theory, however, one could imagine 
relatively principled geo-strategic reasons for the US to maintain its presence in 
Afghanistan.  Somebody in authority, however, needs to own this rationale, or own 
something like it, so that competing public expenditures, in the service of other policies, 
even other security policies -- troops vs carriers vs diplomats vs less vs more -- may be 
judged.  Pettifoggery, "an equilibrium tilted in our favor," whatever that means, as 
commanding General John Nicholson said, simply does not suffice. 
 
 So a substantial part of the US security community, spending nearly 5 % of the 
GDP of the world's largest economy, operates without an articulated future, in some real 
sense without a strategy.  Strategy is subsumed by tactics.  Or, to be more precise, the 
future looks like the status quo, a continuation of what we've been doing, only maybe 
more (or less!) so.  Getting the job done, even if the job is not specified.   
 
 As suggested already, there are profound organizational/institutional constraints 
on what can be seriously thought or said, or not.  Scenarios are formed by people in 
institutions, and the institutions import form, telos, commitments and a host of 
assumptions surprisingly independent of the world ostensibly mapped.  The US military 
provides security through the capacity to project force globally, making it difficult to ask 
what the purpose of US engagement in Afghanistan is, and therefore making it 
impossible, at least under ordinary circumstances, to judge success or failure.  Success or 
failure at what?  Security, presumably -- the conceptual horizon recedes.  From the 
Pentagon's perspective, "militarized global hegemony" is deeply synonymous with 
security.   So nobody in the room has the authority to say, well, why don't we devote 
substantial resources to thinking about doing something else?  People who say things like 
that do not get in the room.11   
 
 The institutional drive towards reiteration is not just a military matter.  Could 
Google seriously entertain the idea of not digitizing things?  Each university, under the 
banner of "innovation," does exactly what every other research university does, 
monetizing inventions, adding administrators.  To generalize, in many powerful settings, 
consensus is often profoundly sociologically, professionally, constrained.  The social 
                                                
11 Deploying Ourselves; and if you are in the room, only certain things are thinkable and 
sayable, see Irving L. Janus. 1983. Groupthink: Psychological studies of policy decisions and 
fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
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horizon is far shorter than the intellectual horizon.12  Institutions do what they do until 
they are forced to do something else, or, in Darwinian fashion, they are replaced.  
 
 Thus, our inquiries are leading us from the future to the past, from power to 
constraint.  
 
III. "Those People Were a Kind of Solution"13 
 
 Phrasing the problem of politics at the present time to be “tempering power” 
answers as many questions as it asks.  Among other things, the phrase posits a holder of 
power, a sovereign with (im)moral agency, in our circles often called “neoliberalism.”  In 
this imaginary, the role of the academic (especially the progressive and engaged 
academic, as all academics must be) is to speak truth to power.  Since our audiences tend 
to be small, it is good to ensure that we have somebody to address, and indeed a part to 
play.  Through Global Foresight and otherwise we are trying to envision other ways for 
the social sciences to engage political, and especially expert/bureaucratic, exercises of 
power.  
 
 Until such time, however, social science imaginaries of power may be expected to 
continue employing traditional corporal metaphors: power dwells inside the body of the 
sovereign (state, corporation, military, usw).  Power is thus imagined to reside in 
occluded spaces that are accessible only by “studying up”14 or journeying into “the belly of 
the beast."15  Consequently, opportunities for ethnographic collaboration often yield to 
demands for critical exposé, speaking truth to power from outside.   
 
 This may be changing.  Recent anthropologies of expertize have contributed to 
expanding such imaginaries showing myriad sites where experts work (sometimes 
creatively, sometimes destructively) to anticipate uncertain futures or advance a 
particular version of society or the social “good.”16  Instead of power congealed, 
ethnographies show problem-spaces characterized by, inter alia, thin resources and 
limited options, and yet a desire for thick collaboration. For examples, in central banks, 
                                                
12 Plato  
13 C.P. Cavafy. 1992. Collected Poems. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 
14 Nader 1972. Laura Nader. 1972. “Up the Anthropologist: Perspectives Gained from 
Studying Up”. In Reinventing Anthropology, edited by Dell Hymes, pp. 284–311. New York: 
Pantheon Books. 
15 Wacquant, Loic. 2002. The curious eclipse of prison ethnography in the age of mass 
incarceration.  
Ethnography, 3(4): 371-397. 
16 For examples:  Boyer 2008; Holmes and Marcus 2005; Fortune 2012; Harvey 2015; Collier 
2017; Garsten and Sörbom 2018). 
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one finds already-ethnographic experimentation with language and behavior,17 and the 
ever-expanding domain of "security" is home to “bleeding edge” experimentation that 
targets life itself.18 
 
 As such collaborations have matured, the voices of those important figures can be 
foregrounded and opened for analysis.  This is much of what Global Foresight is currently 
attempting to do.  Methodologically and pedagogically, we now have an opportunity to 
pay attention to the modes through which ethnographers can engage senior managers, 
institutional leaders and other powerful people, i.e., people who have the capacity to 
shape their domains and so our own contexts. 
 
 At least in lots of situations that matter (by no means all situations) the task does 
not seem to be speaking "truth" (understood as something to which the scholar has 
exclusive access) to "power" (understood as a morally immature yet immensely capable 
sovereign, an impetuous Princeling).  For much of political life, the better and harder 
inquiries concern what might be imagined, and how might such things get done, with 
what consequences?   The scholar has the great advantage of operating at a certain 
remove.  Her job is not at stake in the domains she studies; she can afford to listen and 
can speak with relative credibility.  And so things might begin to make sense.  In short, 
what is needed from the academy is sensitive critique and an eye for possibility.  That is, 
the relatively amateurish position of the ethnographer provides the opportunity for a 
public (as opposed to professional) view, and just maybe, a public accounting.  
 
 Global Foresight prompts us to consider Weber, and our notions of bureaucracy 
more generally, in a bunch of interesting and perhaps revisionist ways.  Bureaucratic 
“rationality,” the "iron cage" of modernity, and even “politics as vocation” – warhorses of 
the sociological imagination -- now seem insufficiently nuanced, at least as such terms are 
usually used in the academy.   
 
IV. Conclusion: A Crisis of Legitimacy 
 
 Much contemporary governance is actually done through decidedly undemocratic 
bureaucracies, what we might collectively call the administrative state.  In this regard, at 
least, the liberal democratic order is much like the old Soviet order, whatever it is Russia 
has now, or China, or even a large corporation or university -- actual governance is 
bureaucratic. 
 
 It is true that in liberal democracies, administration is legitimated by reference to . 
. .  liberal democracy.  Representatives are elected by "We the People," more or less, and 
                                                
17 See Holmes 2014 
18 Maguire 2014. 
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those representatives delegate power to administrative agencies, bureaucracies.  This, at 
any rate, is the story we tell in any number of regulatory law classes in the United States.  
What the EPA, or the SEC, or any agency does is presumptively legitimate because it is 
done by bureaucratic officials hired -- or their bosses were hired -- by people who were 
elected by the people, or who were nominated and approved by people who were elected 
by the people. 
 
 For present purposes, the point is that "liberal democracy" is not the mechanism of 
governance, it is the mechanism of at most distant oversight over the bureaucracies that 
actually wield power, and the mechanism of legitimation for such bureaucracies.  Note 
that a similar dynamic plays across the European project -- whatever the Commission 
does is said to be democratic because of the democratic process in the Member States.  It 
need hardly be said that such legitimacy is thin, believed by few. 
 
 Harold Berman argued that the 20th century "social" revolutions, especially the 
Russian Revolution, experienced in the United States in attenuated form as the New Deal, 
gave rise to a new understanding of the state.  In this understanding, the state is directly 
responsible for civil society writ large -- health and welfare and such.  This vast expansion 
of the role of the state required a concomitant expansion of the apparatus of the state -- 
the growth of the modern bureaucracy.  This can be seen architecturally, in Washington 
DC, if one heads northwest from the White House, in the rows of fine apartments built 
for civil servants in the 1930s and 40s out Connecticut Avenue.  One might also tell a 
parallel story about the rise of the giant modern corporation. 
 
 The changes wrought by the English, American, and French Revolutions -- and a 
great deal of civil life and law in between -- carried with them their own legitimacy.  
These revolutions made the set of ideas for which "liberal democracy" is a shorthand a 
kind of presumptively legitimate armature or model of governance.  A judiciary ought to 
be independent, a legislature democratically elected, and so forth and so on.  Such 
understandings have become part of the collective unconscious, at least in many 
societies.   
 
 The 20th century social revolutions that ushered in the modern administrative 
state, however, were not as successful as a matter of culture, collective psychology.  In 
particular, the social revolutions were not very successful in legitimating the 
administrative state.  Although it came to be widely understood that the government 
should be responsible for education, health care, social rights generally, the social 
revolution left us with little normative ordering of bureaucratic governance along the 
lines of the legitimating tales told for liberal democracy.  Bureaucracy was and is generally 
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seen as alienating, Kafkaesque.  Weber speaks of disenchantment.  Russians have endless 
jokes.  Populists decry distant elites.  Discourse gets rougher; violence may break out.19   
 
 Even within the capitals, bureaucracy is almost always legitimated not on its own 
terms, but instead by reference to liberal democracy, the achievements of the earlier 
revolutions.  In particular, legislatures are said to "delegate" specific regulations and other 
decisions to administrative agencies.  The exercise of power is legitimate because decided 
-- in the abstract and not in detail -- by the duly elected representatives of the people.  
The legitimacy of bureaucracy is thus derivative, even parasitic. 
 
 If elections are seen to be less than genuine, as they sometimes are, and as the 
distance between election and bureaucracy grows, as it seemingly inevitably does, the 
idea that bureaucratic power is either democratic or liberal becomes harder and harder to 
sustain.  Thus "government", "elites," "Europe" and so forth are easily cast as the enemy of 
democracy, indeed the enemy of the people.  
 
 In other words, the "crisis of liberal democracy" is largely a crisis for the 
administrative contemporary state, understood operationally in bureaucratic terms.  For a 
long time, states, that is, bureaucracies, could use stories about "liberal democracy" to 
legitimate themselves.  In many societies and for many people, such stories no longer 
seem convincing.  Instead, bureaucracies are seen to be self-perpetuating expressions of 
elite power. 
 
 What is to be done about this situation?  One answer, beloved by liberals, is to "try 
try again," that is, to make bureaucracy more directly subject to liberal democracy.  
Require more transparency.  Limit the discretion of officials.  Subject administrative 
action to legal review.  There is much to recommend this approach, which is basically the 
approach of administrative law in the United States, but it has its limits.  Judicial review 
                                                
19 There is one other feature here, which is the lack of specificity with which people use 
the state (and increasingly “governmentality”) to signal some nefarious power-
configuration that cannot be tamed – it puts the systemic into social life. In part, Foucault 
is to blame, but he recognized it at least: 187 “As soon as we accept the existance of [a] 
continuity or genetic kinship between different forms of the state, and as soon as we 
attribute a constant evolutionary dynamism to the state, it then becomes possible not 
only to use different analyses to support each other, but also to refer them back to each 
other and so deprive them of their specificity.  For example, an analysis of social security 
and the administrative apparatus on which it rests ends up, via some slippages and 
thanks to some plays on words, referring us to the analysis of concentration camps” 
(Foucault 2008: 187-188). See Foucault, Michel. 2008. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at 
the Collège de France, 1978-1979. Houndsmill and New York: Palgarve MacMillan. 
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and transparency and limitations all tend to produce more bureaucracy, more of the same 
complexities and delays and inscrutable exercises of power that were the source of 
frustration in the first place.   
 
 The opposite approach, ostensibly beloved by many conservatives, is to do away 
with bureaucracy whenever possible.  Shrink government!   Again, there are times when 
this makes sense, but the limitations are equally obvious.  Bureaucratic government -- or 
bureaucratic institutions, whether deemed public or private -- are often required to make 
life possible in complex societies, indeed constitute complex societies.   
 
 Rather than thinking about bureaucratic legitimacy in derivative terms, perhaps 
bureaucracy could be at least partially legitimated by directly addressing the central 
philosophical problem of liberalism itself, the absence of a shared notion of the good. 
 
 Like other critics of liberalism, Alisdair MacIntyre argued that modern political 
and legal thought moves from substantive commitments to particular ideals of the good 
towards procedural commitments, and perhaps to purely formal goods, such as equality, 
defined in terms of such procedures.  This abandonment of notions of the good and 
settling on procedure, preeminently contract, in fact, is what makes the writings of 
Hobbes, or the Peace of Westphalia, "modern" rather than medieval achievements.  If the 
wars of religion cannot be solved by disputation or on the battlefield, perhaps we can 
agree to disagree.  
 
 But, as MacIntyre delineates in After Virtue, such peace comes at a great price.  
There are things that cannot be thought or discussed without some shared notion of the 
goods appropriate to different things, and ultimately important to human fruition.  That 
is, ideas of whether this or that is better for some X presumes a knowledge of what X, 
ideally, should be.  A telos is an end in terms of which a thing may be understood, a 
watch in terms of keeping time.  The watch may also be jewelry or a paperweight, but it is 
"timekeeper" that defines the watch as watch.  This is teleology, Aristotle through 
Aquinas.  It is classical, and medieval, but by definition not modern thought. 
 
 So one way to understand bureaucratic delegation is that it implicitly creates 
spaces in which such thinking or such conversations can happen today, that is, spaces for 
teleological discourse within a frame of liberal democracy that explicitly denies the 
possibility much less achievement of such discourse.  For example, a legislature may 
decide that "it would be good if" we had clean water, or secure borders, or stable financial 
markets, or what have you, and then -- in an organic statute such as the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 -- creates an institution devoted to such ends. 
 
 In this view, bureaucracy is not illiberal merely because of its distance from liberal 
processes and its employment of elites.  Bureaucracy is illiberal in intention and in 
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principle -- it is the way liberal societies manage to have teleological political discourse.  
The problem -- especially for diverse polities like the US, or Europe, and perhaps less 
obviously, Russia or China -- is that teleological discourse, agreement on the good, is hard 
to come by.  People think differently about such things.  So vague abstract standards 
suffice to authorize a regulatory agency, but must be ever half-articulated, somewhat 
disingenuous. 
 
 Telos is associated with the stake towards which Greek footraces were run -- out to 
the stake, around it, and back to the start line.  So the idea of "telos" has not only purpose 
-- run fast -- but a temporality built into it.  The stake is a goal, the thing to be reached, 
the not yet achieved.   The future.  So, with only a little violence, we might understand 
teleology in terms not of purpose secured by consensus on the nature of the good, but in 
terms of preferred futures.   
 
 At this point it is no more than a vague hope, but our idea is that Global Foresight 
and similar scholarly efforts can help people understand bureaucracies as places where 
different futures are collectively thought and worked upon, places of -- at least on good 
days -- good faith and team effort, with a good will.   Rather than Hobbes' Leviathan, or 
Weber's rationalist disenchantment and petty power politics, we might think of 
bureaucracy as public service towards some, still to be articulated, notion of the collective 
good.20  Bureaucracy humanely conceived could thus compliment and buttress those 
forms of government that we, somewhat misleadingly, now call liberal democracy. 
 
END 
 
 
 
                                                
20 More abstractly, human and collective efforts to articulate futures, to avoid or 
ameliorate dangers and enjoy possibilities, can at least partially stand in for the religiously 
grounded notions of "the good" that liberalism has unsuccessfully tried to do without.   
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